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Abstract
The manifold interactions between safety and security aspects makes it
plausible to handle safety and security risks in an unified way. The paper de-
velops a corresponding approach based on the discrete event systems (DEVS)
paradigm. The simulation-based calculation of an individual system evolution
path provides the contribution of this special path of dynamics to the over-
all risk of running the system. Accidentally and intentionally caused failures
are distinguished by the way, in which the risk contributions of the various
evolution paths are aggregated to the overall risk.
The consistency of the proposed risk assessment method with ’traditional’
notions of risk shows its plausibility. Its non-computability, on the other hand,
makes the proposed risk assessment better suitable to the IT security domain
than other concepts of risk developed for both safety and security. Power
grids are discussed as an application example and demonstrates some of the
advantages of the proposed method.
1 Introduction
1.1 Safety Risks and Security Risks
The notion of risk characterizes the expected amount of losses associated with the
usage of a system M . Risk is thus an important system property. Oddly enough,
risk is defined ambiguously. It can be characterized from at least two different
perspectives, safety [82] and cyber security [14]. According to Axelrod [9], they are
distinguished by who is typically acting on whom, whereby both safety and security
usually lay down individual requirements on M [8, 32, 83]: Safety demands that
the system must not harm the world; all deviations from the intended behavior are
caused accidentally. In the contrary, security demands that the world must not
harm the system, though intelligent adversaries belonging to the world are acting
in an intentionally malicious way.
Due to these differences, safety and security risk assessments are typically exe-
cuted independent from each other. This may be justified in some cases, but may
be inappropriate in others. Let us consider some examples, in which safety and
security risks are intertwined.
• Let us assume that a decision has to be made whether free computational
resources of system performance can be invested either in system monitoring
or system defense. Risk assessments carried out independently from the safety
resp. security perspective may hot help in finding an answer.
• In a cyber attack on a German steel mill in 2014, hackers used social engi-
neering techniques for getting access to the control systems of the production
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plant. They modified the control systems in a way, that the safety of the plant
was compromised. It was not possible anymore to shut down a blast furnace.
The resulting damage of the plant was significant [53].
• The Stuxnet worm [46, 62] is an example of a self-propagating malware com-
promising specific industrial control systems. As a result, uranium enrichment
facilities in Iran seem to suffer substantial damage.
The rapid spread of embedded systems lead to the statement that there is no safety
without security and no security without safety. Without a combined view at safety
and security, the situations described above can not be appropriately analyzed.
Instead, trade-offs and overlaps between safety and security suggest the development
of a unified approach to safety and security risk assessments as recommended in e.g.
[54]. This paper introduces such a unified notion of risk.
1.2 Risk Assessment Strategy
Systematically extending a model of the considered system by various safety and se-
curity aspects usually leads to a complex model (see e.g. [88, 86]). This complexity
challenges traditional risk assessment methods executed by hand and being infor-
mal only. For reasons of simplicity, these methods are also usually based on static
considerations. Static methods provide results quite fast, they are well applicable
to systems of significant size, and in many cases the results are a sufficiently good
approximation to the real situation. In other cases, however, neglecting system
dynamics will be an oversimplification [24, 48]. Indeed, [47] states that static risk
assessments suffer severe limitations as soon as process safety is considered. Espe-
cially critical in this respect is a complex dynamics, since minor local fault-related
events may lead to an unexpected critical global behavior of the overall system in
this way.
Such implications caused by a complex dynamics may have different roots.
Faults may occur concurrently and consecutively and may interact with each other.
They sometimes propagate across the system compromising fault control strategies.
Back-reactions of the system on failure management actions are possible as well.
Intelligent system components like an AI or a human operator enable often an effec-
tive risk management by their problem solving capabilities, but show sometimes an
unforseeable behavior. If these components serve as the counterpart of an also intel-
ligent adversary following an adaptive long-term strategy, the risk assessment has
to account for planning, learning, imperfect decision and other dynamic processes.
Static informal risk assessments are of limited help in such cases.
Consequently, in this paper a simulation-based risk assessment approach is de-
veloped. Up to now, the potential of such a risk concept for handling complex
situations is seemingly not yet discussed in necessary depth [50].
1.3 Related Work
Despite of the differences between safety and security, an unified risk assessment
is discussed and judged as possible e.g. in [16, 44]. Concepts of risk, which are
applicable to both safety and security, can be found in [9, 69]. Common risk assess-
ment processes, though not simulation-based, are developed in [58, 60]. A concept
integrating safety and security risks based on fault trees is given in in [34].
The usefulness of model-based approaches for risk-related considerations is shown
in [4, 5]. These models can then be used to simulate different behaviors and to quan-
tify risk-related properties [70]. Applications of discrete event simulations to cyber
security problems are discussed in [22, 29]. Simulations as tools for risk assessment
purposes have been discussed in [43] for the special case of stochastically varying
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demands on a production facility. The authors of [13] focus on the Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation of air traffic control operations. Examples of a simulation-based handling
of safety without inclusion of security are [3, 35]. Similar considerations from the
security risk point of view were made in [15, 23, 25, 63, 79, 90]. A simulation-based
analysis of system models from the perspectives of both safety and security can be
found in [11, 18].
1.4 Structure of the Paper
Section 2 describes, how a system and its potential faults can be represented by a
formal model. In section 3, we start to develop the notion of a simulation-based
risk measure. At first, this is done for a single individual evolution of the system.
The aggregation of all these risk contributions provided by the overall set of indi-
vidual system evolutions to an overall risk value is described in section 4. Section 5
demonstrates the advantages of the simulation-based risk measure using power grids
as an example. The paper closes with an outlook discussing key properties of the
proposed risk measure.
2 Formalization of Systems
2.1 Suitability of the DEVS Paradigm
A formal risk assessment for the system S requires at first a suitable model of
S. Such a model can be provided by the DEVS formalism [91, 93] developed by
Zeigler in 1984. The DEVS formalism is proposed due to its maturity, generality
and flexibility. Its system definition is closely related to a general (time-dependent)
system, which assures closeness to practice. DEVS is a multi-paradigm formalism
[37, 72, 96, 97], which has the capability to represent (almost) all kinds of systems,
which have an input/output behavior describable by sequences of events [36, 94]. It
can integrate such different system definitions like differential equations and discrete
event systems in a common framework. This supports the handling of complex
systems making use of different system formalizations and being related to different
science disciplines with individual approaches for describing systems. The DEVS
paradigm has the expressive power of a Turing machine [40]. In principle, it is thus
able to represent various risk related aspects like risk management actions, risk
transfer, fault tolerance etc. This property is also helpful for representing cognitive
aspects, which may be important for the IT security perspective. Hence, DEVS
models are more general than e.g. Bayesian networks or petri nets.
Though the DEVS formalism can handle many types of discrete systems [95],
it is not able to handle stochastic aspects in its original formulation. Safety and
security risk assessments are inherently stochastical, however, due to the necessity
to express the frequencies of faults. This gap was closed by the of the STDEVS
formalism, which is an extension of the DEVS formalism. More precisely, a DEVS
model is a special case of a STDEVS model [49].
2.2 DEVS Models of Systems
In the following, the definition of a DEVS model is recapitulated. following [80,
87]. Being precisely, we will talk about atomic DEVS models. coupled DEVS
models have been defined in the literature as well, which are more general from the
structural point of view. It can be shown, however, that coupled and atomic DEVS
models have the same expressive power [91, 93].
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Definition 1 (DEVS Model). An (atomic) DEVS model is an 8-tupelM = (X,Y,Q,
qstart, δint, σ, δext, λ) with
• X as set of input events
• Y as set of output events
• Q as set of states
• qstart ∈ Q as initial state
• δint∶QÐ→ Q as the internal transition function
• σ∶QÐ→ R+0 ∪ {∞} as the time advance function
• δext∶ Q¯ × 2X Ð→ Q as the external transition function defined on Q¯ = {(q, t) ∣
q ∈ Q,0 ≤ t ≤ σ(q)} as the total set of states
• λ∶QÐ→ Y ∪ {φ} as the output function
Remark 2 (DEVS Model).
a) The time advance function σ gives the lifetime of an internal state q ∈ Q. The
internal state q′ ∈ Q entered after reaching the end of the lifetime σ(q) of q is
determined by the internal transition function δint via q′ = δint(q). As time in
the real world always advances, σ(q) must be non-negative. The value σ(q) = 0
indicates an instantaneous transition. If the system is to stay in an internal
state q forever, this is modelled by means of σ(q) =∞.
b) The definition of the set Q¯ of total states is based on the idea to supplement
the internal state q ∈ Q by the elapsed time e ∈ [0, σ(q)] since the system has
entered the state q ∈ Q.
c) External events influence the system as described by the external transition func-
tion δext∶ Q¯ × 2X Ð→ Q. This function can handle sets of events representing
simultaneously occurring events.
d) The output event λ(q) is generated when the time e elapsed after entering the
state q ∈ Q reaches the lifetime σ(q) of the state q, i.e. e = σ(q). At all other
times, the output is equal to the non-event φ.
Incoming events can trigger transitions between states. Thus, the dynamics
of DEVS models is based on the so-called time-advance function σ and the state
transition functions δint and δext. This leads to the following description of the
dynamics of a DEVS model M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, σ, δext, λ) [92]. Let q ∈ Q be
the actual state of M . We have to distinguish two cases. The first case is that
no external event occurs, the second case handles the arrival of events x ∈ 2X . In
the first case, the system dynamics is determined by the lifetime σ(q) of q and
the internal transition function δint, in the second case by the external transition
function δext.
In the first case — i.e. without the occurrence of external events x ∈ 2X — the
system remains in the state q for time σ(q) ∈ R+0 ∪ {∞}. This means:
• For σ(q) = 0, the state q is immediately changed to the state q′ ∈ Q given by
q′ = δint(q). This state transition can not be influenced by external events.
• For σ(q) = ∞, the system stays in state q as long as no external events x
occurs.
• For σ(q) ∈ R+, the system outputs the value λ(q) after expiration of the
lifetime σ(q) of the state q. Afterwards, the system state changes to q′ ∈ Q
given by q′ = δint(q).
In the second case — i.e. with occurrence of external events x ∈ 2X — the system
changes to a new state q′ = δext(q, t, x), whereby (q, t) ∈ Q¯ is the actual total state
of M when the set x of events occurs.
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2.3 STDEVS Models of Systems
Stochastics is required for representing probabilistically occurring safety and secu-
rity faults. We introduce stochatics by transiting from the deterministic DEVS
formalism to the corresponding probabilistic STDEVS formalism. In effect, an
(atomic) STDEVS-model is an (atomic) DEVS model supplemented by mappings
Pint, Pext providing transition probability information for the internal and external
transition functions δint, δext. Thus, an (atomic) STDEVS model has the structure
[20, 21] M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext, Pext, λ). In this definition, δint∶Q→ 2Q
is the internal transition function, which describes the set of possible successor states
δint(q) ⊆ 2Q to the actual state q for situations without occurrence of an external
event. Thus, δint(q) contains all the subsets of Q that the next state can belong
to. The partial function Pint∶Q × 2Q → [0,1] gives the probability Pint(q,Q′) that
the system model M being in state q makes a transition to a state q′ ∈ Q′ ∈ δint(q).
Concerning the requirements for the well-definedness of the probability spaces, see
[20, 21].
Corresponding to δint, δext∶Q×R+0 ×2X → 2Q is the external transition function.
It describes the set of possible successor states q′ ∈ δext(q, t, x) ⊆ 2Q for a situation
with occurrence of external events x ∈ 2X , when the system model M is in a total
state (q, t) ∈ Q¯. Analogous to Pint, the partial function Pext∶Q×R+0 ×2X×2Q → [0,1]
gives the probability Pext(q, t, x,Q′) that the system model M being in the total
state (q, t) makes a transition to a state q′ ∈ Q′ ∈ δext(q) at occurrence of events x.
For a STDEVS model, the lifetime of a state q ∈ Q is defined in the same way as
in the case of a DEVS model, though concerning e.g. safety problems, a stochastic
lifetime function σ would allow a more canonical representation of stochastically
occurring faults. Being more precise, the lifetime of a state q ∈ Q would then become
a mapping σ from a state to a random variable. If the random variable allows any
time span between two consecutive faults, then the tree of simulation paths would
contain branching points with uncountably many options for a continuation.
Definition 3 (Language of a STDEVS system).
Let M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext, Pext, λ) be a STDEVS model and h ∈ R+0 be
a nonnegative real number. The set of possible simulation paths of M limited to
the time interval ]0, h] is called the language L(q, h) of M for the (time) horizon
h and for the initial state q ∈ Q. Formally, a simulation path τ is a sequence τ =(ρ1, . . . , ρk) representing the history of the corresponding simulation run consisting
of elements ρj = (qj , tj ,Xj) ∈ Q×R+0×2X . These elements ρj document the start resp.
end states of all state transitions qj−1 → qj during the simulation run, eventually
triggered by the set Xj of incoming events. In this definition, the start state q0 of the
first state transition (i.e. j = 1) is equal to the given initial state q. In the case q =
qstart, we will usually write L(h) instead of L(q, h). The language L(h) represents
the possible behaviors of the system, which can be produced by different faults and
event sequences. The case Xj = ∅ indicates an internal state transition qj−1 → qj,
otherwise an external state transition is represented. The times tj indicate, how
long M was in the state qj−1 for j < k. For j = k, the time tk is limited by the
horizon h. In this way, t1 +⋯ + tk = h is assured. A subsequence (ρj , ρj+1, . . . , ρj′)
of τ with 1 ≤ j < j′ ≤ k is called a subpath of τ .
For a DEVS resp. STDEVS model, an event may arrive anytime and may lead
to various state transitions. Though the number of internal states in a DEVS resp.
STDEVS model is finite and thus countable, of course, the set of total states de-
scribed as a combination of internal states and timing information is not. It can be
shown, however, that in a DEVS model these principally uncountable many cases
of model behavior will only lead to countably many different state transition se-
quences [41, 42]. Since a STDEVS model is in essence a DEVS model extended
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by probabilities of state transitions, the representing state-transition graph remains
finite (in an appropriate representation) for a STDEVS model as well. As a con-
sequence, the tree of possible state sequences of M has a countable size and each
node in the tree has only a finite number of branching options. For a given finite
time horizon, the tree of simulation paths is thus finite, too, as long as the state-
transition graph does not contain cycles with transition time equal to 0. We will
assume in the following that such cycles do not exist in the model M .
Remark 4 (Number of Branching Options). In the following, we assume that the
simulation tree contains only branching points with a finite number of options. This
condition is fulfilled, if e.g. external events can arrive only at a finite number of
occasions within the time interval [0, h]. For cases with non-finite many branching
options, the theory, which is presented in this paper, has to be extended. This can
be done based on the fact that the number of different state transitions will remain
countable under these circumstances as well. As soon as the criticalities assigned to
the nodes of the simulation tree depend only on the system states and not on timing
resp. duration aspects, it will thus suffice to consider a countable (finite in the case
of a finite horizon) number of sample timings of external events. If the criticalities
depend on timings resp. durations as well, one may eventually consider the varying
arrival times of external events via Monte Carlo simulations.
Since STDEVS models are a generalization of DEVS models and since the ex-
pressive power of the DEVS formalism corresponds to that of a Turing machine, the
class of systems representable by a STDEVS model includes all Turing computable
situations. Additionally, STDEVS models cover many types of stochastic discrete
systems.
2.4 Inclusion of Faults in STDEVS Models
The proposed approach of risk assessment is based on a STDEVS model M of the
system S under consideration. Usually, the model M represents only the nominal
behavior of S. A risk assessment will consider off-nominal modes of the system as
well, which thus have to be represented in the model. As a consequence, we need
an extension of M covering safety- and security-related faults and failures.
In the first step, M is supplemented by components of the system environment
U , which are either affecting the system S or affected by S in a safety or security
relevant way. Dependent on the situations considered as relevant, this may include
components, which are related to safety and security only in an indirect way. Con-
cerning security risk assessments, for example, the criticality of a violation of the
system security will sometimes depend on the exploitation of this violation. If sen-
sitive data have been exposed, the attacker may choose the option just to indicate
that he has seen these data; but he may also use the option to publish these data.
The criticality of the two choices may be very different.
In the second step, the safety and security problems themselves are represented
in the model as well as components related to problem management. Especially the
adversarial scenario given by cyber security can only be handled adequately if both
sides — the attacked system S and the attacker — are modeled at a similar level
of detail. For example, a cognitive attacker requires a cognitive systems control as
counterpart for assuring an appropriate defense. Such a counterpart keeps track on
the attack to avoid unnecessary threats, and to organize the defense in an adequate
manner. These actions of the defender are contributing to the controllability of a
specific risk leading to a mitigation of its criticality.
In the third step, descriptions of the interactions between the system S and
its environment U are added using the new components, which are introduced in
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the first and second step. These interactions are essential for safety and security
considerations as discussed in the introduction.
After these extensions, the modelM describes both the nominal and off-nominal
behavior of the system S. Moreover, M is now necessarily a stochastic model, since
e.g. a fault typically occurs with a certain probability. This makes M suitable
for the intended risk assessment. The STDEVS formalism seems to be a suitable
modeling paradigm for the extended model M .
3 Risk Contributions of Simulation Paths
3.1 Simulation Paths as Elementary Risk Contributions
In the last section, the modeling formalism is described. A simulation of the re-
sulting modelM gives the corresponding system evolution with all occurring faults,
resulting failures, and their consequences. In the following we discuss, how the gen-
erated simulation history gives the associated contribution to the overall risk. As
usual, the contribution is determined by the criticality assigned to this specific simu-
lation path — measuring the amount of disadvantages associated with its realization
— and the probability of its occurrence among all possible system evolutions. An
aggregation of all such risk contributions gives the value of the overall risk. From
the mathematical point of view, this calculation defines a risk measure R for an uni-
fied assessment of safety and security risks. For its formal definition, the technical
notions of path criticality, path probability, and the path aggregation operator has
to be provided. Before proceeding accordingly, we take a closer look at the course
of action after the occurrence of a fault. This will give a better understanding of
the dynamical mechanisms associated with a fault.
We start our considerations with a nominally behaving system. If a component of
the system starts to behave off-nominal, then the system will usually alter the path
of dynamics. In a STDEVS modelM = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext, Pext, λ), this
is represented as a state transition q1 → q′1, q1, q′1 ∈ Q. The new state q′1 ∈ Q may
be the first element of a state transition sequence, which transmits the information
about the occurrence of the problem cause — in the following called cause for short
— to other parts of the system (or its environment). There, the consequences of
the cause may become effective by executing another change in the system state,
i.e. a state transition q2 → q′2, q2, q′2 ∈ Q2. Then the new state q′2 is the (potentially
disadvantageous) effect of the cause q1 → q′1. Interpreting a cause as start point of
a certain behavior the effect can be considered as a (disadvantageous) consequence
of the behavior resulting from the cause. Such a cause-and-effect resp. causality
related perspective of risk is discussed in [28, 30], whereby effects are also called
consequences. This kind of perspective is supported in [31] for safety and in [71]
for security. Additionally, one has to note that in the description of the general
cause-effect relationship given above, the state transitions q1 → q′1 and q2 → q′2 need
not necessarily be different.
3.2 Criticality of a Simulation Path
The representation of system faults, which may contribute to the overall risk R,
in the model M is an important step towards actually calclulating R, because we
are now able to derive the existence of potential problems from M . For actually
evaluating the contribution of this specific problem to the overall risk quantitatively,
attributes have to be provided for describing its properties. As typical for quantify-
ing a risk, one has to know how frequent and how severe a specific system problem
is. The severity is given as criticality c∶ Q¯→ R+0 defined on the total states Q¯ of the
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STDEVS model M . It measures the amount of disadvantages resulting from the
occurrence of a specific state q ∈ Q for a certain duration t ∈ R+0 . According to this
purpose, c(q, t) ∈ R+0 will be a nonnegative real number. States q with c(q, t) > 0
are representing modes of the system, which may contribute to the overall risk.
Definition 5 (Criticality of an Effect). Let M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext,
Pext, λ) be a STDEVS model. Let τ ∈ L(h) be a simulation path of M for the (time)
horizon h. The path τ = (ρ1, . . . , ρk), k ≥ 1, with ρj = (qj , tj ,Xj) ∈ Q×R+0 ×2X gives
the states qj together with their lifetimes tj and thus the total states q¯j = (qj , tj).
Then the criticality of a total state q¯j = (qj , tj) is given by c(qj , tj). Formally, c is
a mapping c∶Q ×R+0 → R+0 . In the realm of criticality, both qj and q¯j = (qj , tj) are
called an effect.
A simulation path τ may contain many effects q¯1, . . . , q¯k. Since these effects q¯j
can interact with each other, the overall criticality c(τ) of the simulation path τ
may be determined in a more complex way than simple summation of the individ-
ual criticalities c(q¯j). An example would be the disposal of two irritant chemicals.
They may produce a deadly poison in combination [26]. In other cases, they may
neutralize each other. The capability to calculate the overall consequences of several
failures maybe interacting with and influencing each other is an important advan-
tage of a simulation-based risk assessment approach. As a conclusion, the criticality
measure c for simulation paths must have the potential to take the variety of rela-
tionships between fault effects into account. The precise shape of c will thus depend
on the specific application.
Definition 6 (Criticality of Effects). Let M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext, Pext,
λ) be a STDEVS model. Let τ ∈ L(h) be a simulation path of M for the (time)
horizon h. The path τ = (ρ1, . . . , ρk), k ≥ 1, with ρj = (qj , tj ,Xj) ∈ Q×R+0 ×2X gives
the states qj together with their lifetimes tj and thus the total states q¯j = (qj , tj) ∈ Q¯.
For handling multiple faults, the domain of c consists of a (temporally ordered)
sequence q¯ = (q¯1, . . . , q¯k) of individual total states. Thus, the extended criticality c
has the signature c∶ Q¯ ×⋯ × Q¯→ R+0 .
The definition above extends the criticality c in such a way, that criticality
correlations can be taken into account (see figure 1). The lifetimes tj of the total
states q¯j provide information about time differences between the effects, which may
influence c as well. If the criticality correlation depends on additional parameters,
the values of these parameters can typically be coded in the states Q of a STDEVS
model.
3.3 Probability of a Simulation Path
Safety and security problems will occur probabilistically. Accordingly, the over-
all dynamical behavior of a system model M displays a tree instead of a single
path. The probability of taking a specific branching option in this tree is given by
the probability p(γ) of the corresponding state transition γ. For calculating the
probability p(τ) of a whole simulation path τ , which may result from several such
branching choices γi, we have to compose the probabilities p(γi) assigned to these
choices γi. This can be done with the Bayes rule (see figure 2).
Definition 7 (Probability of Cause). Let M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext, Pext,
λ) be a STDEVS model. Let γ = (q, t,X ′, q′) be a state transition q → q′ between
states q, q′ ∈ Q occurring at lifetime t of state q, eventually triggered by a set X ′ of
external events (X ′ = ∅ is a valid choice). Then the probability of executing γ is
designated as p(γ). The value of p(γ) is given by the internal transition probability
Pint(q,{q′}) for X ′ = ∅ and by the external transition probability Pext(q, t,X ′,{q′})
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Figure 1: The figure shows the progressively diversifying state tree produced
by the simulation of a stochastic model. The simulation path τ contains several
disadvantageous consequences occurring in the states q10, q12, q16, and q20. These
disadvantages are quantified by the criticalities c10, c12, c16, and c20. When assessing
the overall criticality c(τ), all the c10, c12, c16, and c20 have to be taken into account
and calculated with each other.
for X ′ ≠ ∅ with the system being in the total state (q, t). The 4-tupel γ represents
a so-called cause.
Definition 8 (Probability of a Sequence of Causes). Let M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint,
Pint, σ, δext, Pext, λ) be a STDEVS model. Let τ ∈ L(h) be a simulation path of
M , with (time) horizon h. Assigned to τ = (ρ1, . . . , ρk) with ρj = (qj , tj ,Xj) ∈
Q×R+0 ×2X is the (temporally ordered) sequence γ = (γ1, . . . , γk) of state transitions
γj ∶= (qj−1, tj ,Xj , qj) with q0 ∶= qstart. Then the probability p(γ) of the occurrence
of the sequence γ is given by
p(γ) = p(γ1) ⋅ p(γ1 ∣ γ2) ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ p(γ1, . . . , γk−1 ∣ γk)
according to Bayes rule. The expression p(γ1, . . . , γj−1 ∣ γj) results from the fact
that when the state transition γj is triggered, the state transitions γ1, . . . , γj−1 were
already executed and have set the preconditions for γj.
3.4 A Notion of Risk for Simulation Paths
We now define risk contribution provided by an individual system behavior repre-
sented by a corresponding simulation path τ = (ρ1, . . . , ρk) ∈ L(h). Using the causes
γ = (γ1, . . . , γk) and the effects q¯ = (q¯1, . . . , q¯k) belonging to the path τ , we are now
able to assign both a probability and a criticality to τ via the measures p(γ) and
c(q¯) defined in the last section.
Definition 9 (Probability and Criticality of Simulation Paths).
Let M be a STDEVS model and h ∈ R+0 the horizon of the simulation. Let τ ∈ L(h)
be a simulation path of M for the (time) horizon h. The path τ = (ρ1, . . . , ρk) is
associated with a sequence γ = (γ1, . . . , γk) of causes and a sequence q¯ = (q¯1, . . . , q¯k)
of effects. Then the probability p(τ) and the criticality c(τ) of the path τ are defined
as p(τ) ∶= p(γ) and c(τ) ∶= c(q¯).
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qstart ⋮
qm ⋮
qms τms
p(qm → qms)
qm1 τm1
p(qm → qm1)
p(qstart → qm)
q1 ⋮
q1r τ1r
p(q1 → q1r)
q11 τ11
p(q1 → q11)
p(qstart→ q
1)
Figure 2: The simulation of a determninistic model gives a single sequence τ
of system states. For stochastic models, the state sequence diversifies to a tree
of possible simulation paths. The probability of transiting to a specific successor
state at a branching point in the tree is determined by the probability Pint(q′,{q′′})
assigned to the corresponding state transition q′ → q′′. Let us take a closer look
at the simulation path τ11 representing the state sequence qstart → q1 → q11. Using
the abbreviations T ∶= qstart → q1 and T ′ ∶= q1 → q11, the probability p(τ11) of the
occurrence of path τ11 is equal to the probability p(τ11) = p(T ∧T ′) that both state
transitions T,T ′ occur. Applying Bayes rule, it holds p(T ∧ T ′) = p(T ) ⋅ p(T ∣ T ′).
In the example, p(T ) = p(qstart → q1) is the probability that the state q1 is reached
from the start state qstart. The probability p(T ∣ T ′) on the other hand is the
probability that from the state q1, which have been reached after execution of T , a
transition to the state q11 takes place. This means p(T ∣ T ′) = p(T ′) = p(q1 → q11).
Using the probability p(τ) and criticality c(τ) of the simulation path τ we will
now define a risk measure R for a path τ .
Definition 10 (Risk Measure for Simulation Paths). Let M be a STDEVS model
and h ∈ R+0 be a horizon. Then a risk measure R∶L(h)Ð→ R+0 can be defined for the
simulation paths τ ∈ L(h) of M by assigning a nonnegative real value to τ defined
by R(τ) = p(τ) ⋅ c(τ).
4 Overall Risk of a System
4.1 Overall Risk as Aggregation of Risk Contributions
A simulation can construct a tree-like representation of the system behavior con-
sisting of individual imulation paths. This representation contains both safety and
security problems. For safety problems, the probabilities assigned to branching
options are usually determined locally. For security problems, the story may be
different. Intelligent attackers (and defenders as well) may predict the outcomes of
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the various simulation paths and then they will select the most promising one for
finding the best way to act. Then, the probabilities of choosing specific consecutive
branching options are not statistically independent anymore. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to describe, how these probabilities are determined. According to [84],
stochastics and strategies has to be integrated in the context of stochastic game
theory [59, 64]. Instead, we will focus on the concept, how the risk contributions
R(τ) provided by the set L(h) of possible simulation paths τ for a given time hori-
zon h are aggregated to a risk assessment R for the model M . Since L(h) describes
the overall behavior of M , it is plausible to define a risk measure R for M as sum
over the risk values R(τ) assigned to the different simulation paths τ ∈ L(h) of M .
In this way, the risk R assigned toM is the sum of the criticalities c(τ) of the paths
τ ∈ L(h) weighted by their probabilities p(τ). This corresponds to the traditional
form of a risk measure for safety aspects as expectation value of the criticality over
all possible cases.
Definition 11 (Risk Measure). Let M = (X,Y,Q, qstart, δint, Pint, σ, δext, Pext, λ) be
a STDEVS model and h ∈ R+0 be a horizon. Then a risk measure R∶R+0 Ð→ R+0
parameterized by the horizon h is defined by
R(h) ∶= ∑
τ∈L(h)R(τ) = ∑τ∈L(h)p(τ) ⋅ c(τ)
If we consider a language L(q, h) for the initial state q ∈ Q instead of L(h) for the
canonical choice q = qstart, the corresponding risk is designated as R(q, h).
The definition of R(h) can be considered as plausible, because a limitation of
the horizon h reduces the definition to traditional definitions of e.g. safety risk.
This topic is discussed more thoroughly in the outlook.
Remark 12 (Mixed Random/Strategic Situations). The necessity of a unified han-
dling of stochastics and strategies may not be limited to considerations regarding cy-
ber security. As soon as the system contains a cognitive control component following
a long-term aim, the control actions chosen along a simulation path are not uncor-
related anymore. This situation is analogous to the case of a cognitive attacker, who
is trying to exploit a system not actively defended. For stochastic systems, in which
only one side is following a long-term aim, the general theory of stochastic games
is not required. Instead, representing the situation as Markov decision process will
suffice.
4.2 Correlation of Probabilities by Cognitive Entities
In the preceeding section we have defined a simulation-based risk measure unify-
ing safety and security. The risk measure is determined by the criticalities and
probabilities of the simulation paths. The underlying idea should be clear from the
perspective of safety. For security, however, it may be not immediately clear how
the existence of cognitive entities will lead to a correlation of probabilities due to
their individual aims, strategies and long-range plans. For explaining this effect, we
have to give several definitions at first.
Definition 13 (Simulation Path Operations).
a) The operator ○ designates the concatenation of two simulation paths
b) Let τ = (ρ1, . . . , ρk) ∈ L(qstart, h) with ρj = (qj , tj ,Xj) be a simulation path and
ql with 1 < l < k a system state occurring on τ . Let τ1 = (ρ1, . . . , ρl−1) be the
subpath of τ from qstart to ql−1. Then it exists a simulation path τ2 ∈ L(ql, h′)
for the horizon h′ = h−∑l−1j=1 tj with τ = τ1 ○ τ2. In the following, we will use the
notation τpost(ρl) ∶= τ2.
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Definition 14 (Subsets of a Language).
a) Let Lτ1(h) ⊆ L(h) designate the subset of all paths τ = (qj , tj ,Xj)kj=1 ∈ L(h),
which start with a common subpath τ1 = (qj , tj ,Xj)lj=1, l ≤ k, of τ . This means,
that for a path τ ∈ Lτ1(h) it exists a path τ2 ∈ L(ql+1, h′) for the horizon h′ =
h −∑lj=1 tj with τ = τ1 ○ τ2.
b) Let ρ be a node in the simulation tree. Then succ(ρ) designates the set of nodes,
which succeeds the node ρ in a path τ ∈ L(h). For all members ρ′ ∈ succ(ρ) with
ρ = (q, t,X), ρ′ = (q′, t′,X ′) exists an internal or external state transition from
q to q′.
After providing the necessary notational definitions, we will now discuss what
happens in a decision point of the simulation tree. Let the system be in the state
q ∈ Q in this decision point. From start state qstart to decision point the simulation
has already generated the path τ1 ∈ L(qstart, h) for a horizon h. In general, the
decider will include the path τ1 in her considerations, because the overall criticality
of a simulation path τ may very well depend on events occuring in the subpath τ1.
A cognitive entity, which is responsible for making the decision in state q, de-
termines the transition probabilities Prob(q → q′) of the possible continuations
given by ρ′ ∈ succ(ρ) with ρ = (q, t,X), ρ′ = (q′, t′,X ′) according to its deci-
sion. The set succ(ρ) represents the available choices of the pending decision. A
decider acting totally rational and faultless may using only yes/no-decisions (i.e.
Prob(q → q′) ∈ {0,1}). As soon as imperfections of the decision process are taken
into account, the probabilities may also assume intermediate values. The decision
process itself is of no relevance for risk assessment. Furthermore, a simulation tree
developed by the decider for predictive purposes may usually differ from the corre-
sponding part of the simulation tree used for the risk calculation.
4.3 Special Case of (Risk-)Rationality
We supplement our considerations with some remarks concerning a situation, in
which both attacker and defender — the two deciders belonging to the considered
system — are using the same simulation tree as the risk assessment procedure.
They are following the explicit goals of risk maximization and risk minimization,
respectively. It results an adversarial situation. The win of one ’player’ is the
loss of the ’other’. If we additionally assume as a simplification that the system
is strictly deterministic besides of the decisions to be made and that attacker and
defender are executing measures and countermeasures alternately, the description
as a (combinatorial) zero-sum game becomes adequate [12]. Then, the definition of
the overall risk R can be based on a minimax algorithm [76], which is processing
the simulation tree recursively. Executing a recursive minimax algorithm instead of
just summing up the risk contributions assigned to the indivifual simulation paths
is the result of integrating the decisions of attacker and defender on the one hand
and the risk assessment procedure on the other.
We discuss the situation at a specific node ρ = (q, t,X) of the simulation tree.
We will define the risk inductively. Let τ1 designate the simulation path from the
root node of the simulation tree to ρ. Let us suppose for a moment that no decision
has to be made on the pathway τ2 from ρ to the terminating leaf in the simulation
tree. Since the system is assumed to be deterministic, this condition means that τ2
does not contain a branching point. Thus, Lτpost(ρ)(h) ⊆ L(h) consists of a single
path τ1 ○ τ2 only. The risk assigned to this path (see definition 10) is equal to the
risk assigned to Lτpost(ρ)(h) = {τ1 ○ τ2}.
If a decsion has to be made in the node ρ, it exists more than one possible con-
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tinuation. The corresponding set Lτpost(ρ)(h) of simulation paths has the structure
Lτpost(ρ)(h) = ⊍
ρ′=(q′,t′,X′)∈succ(ρ)Lτpost(ρ′)(h − t′).
Based on the induction hypothesis, the risk Rq′ assigned to Lτpost(ρ′)(h) is already
known. For calculating the risk Rq assigned to Lτpost(ρ)(h), the definitions 8 and
11 lead to
Rq = ∑
q′∈succ(ρ)Prob(q → q′)Rq′ .
It remains to determine the transition probabilities representing the decision result.
For convenience, let us designate Rmax(q, h) ∶= max
q′∈succ(ρ)R(q′, h) and Rmin(q, h) ∶=
min
q′∈succ(ρ)R(q′, h). In both cases exist a node ρ′ ∈ succ(ρ) succeeding ρ in a simulation
path with Rmax(q, h) = R(q′, h) resp. Rmin(q, h) = R(q′, h). This state is designated
as q′max resp. q′min. We assign the transition probability Prob(q → q′) = 1 for
q′ = q′max resp. q′ = q′min and Prob(q → q′) = 0 otherwise.
The induction stops when the root qstart of the simulation tree is reached. For
qstart, it holds R(h) = Rqstart .
5 Example Power Grids
5.1 Power Grids as Exemplary Application
Though the proposed approach of an unified assessment of safety and security risks
is appealing from the theoretical point of view, a systematic processing of all possible
evolution paths will require a significant computational effort. The necessary effort
is justified, however, if the system under consideration has e.g. a complex dynamics
hardly accessible by static evaluations. Distribution networks like power grids [67]
have this property due to phenomena like cascading failures. Additionally, they can
be modeled canonically in a very simple way as a network. At the moment, power
grids are intensively studied in Germany due to the intended exit from nuclear and
fossil energy sources [17], which is accompanied by a transition from a centralized
continuous to a decentralized, more or less fluctuating power supply. This requires
corresponding modifications of the power grid itself, which have to be assessed w.r.t.
potential safety and security risks.
5.2 Model Structure
Using a DEVS model of power grids, we demonstrate the principles of a combined
simulation-based safety and security risk-assessment. We will develop the model
only at concept level. Information about a detailed representation of power grids
by DEVS models can be found in e.g. [55, 65, 66, 85]. Here, the power grid is
represented as network (V,E) with nodes V and edges E between the nodes. Each
edge e ∈ E has two attributes, its flow capacity ae and its actual load la. The actual
load la is determined by the flow across the network resulting from the supplies
and demands Cv ∈ R at the network nodes v ∈ V . The attribute Cv of the nodes
v ∈ V indicates a power consumption of an amount ∣Cv ∣ in the case of Cv < 0. For
Cv > 0, the node v is producing power with an amount of Cv. The ratio between
flow capacity ae and actual load le determines the probability pe that the link e ∈ E
will fail in the next time cycle. As far as possible, the node v will try to avoid loads
le exceeding the flow capacity ae significantly for keeping the failure probability pe
low. The possible failures of the edges e ∈ E represent the safety aspects of the
network (V,E).
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Criticalities cv assigned to the nodes v ∈ V quantify the disadvantages of a
power loss for the consumers supplied by v. The possibility of multiple concurrent
failures requires an assessment taking correlations between node failures (and thus
the corresponding criticalities) into account. Imagine a situation in which a hospital
does not accept new patients due to power loss. They have to be transported to
other hospitals located nearby, which may be usually acceptable. If the power
loss affects not only a single but all hospitals of a region, the situation is much
more severe due to the long distances for transports to a region with intact power
supply, say, 200 km away. Hence, the criticality c assigned to such a situation may
be considerably larger than the sum of the criticalities cj assigned to power-loss
situations for single hospitals.
The nodes v ∈ V control the power flow across the network (V,E) in such a
way that the actual loads la on the edges e ∈ E are kept into the limits given by
the edge capacities ae wherever possible. For this purpose, the nodes v ∈ V use
information provided locally by other nodes v′ ∈ V . The information is distributed
via an information network (V,F ). It consist of the states of the edges e ∈ E incident
to v′ (working resp. not working) and of the power consumption or production at
v′ given by Cv′ . This provides (subjective) knowledge about the power grid (V,E),
which enables v to schedule the power flow incoming at v across the edges carrying
the power outflow. As a consequence, every edge f ∈ F of the information network(V,F ) is a vulnerability, because a potential attacker may influence the power grid
functionality by modifying the transmitted information. Such a modification may
happen intentionally with a certain probability pf , which represents the security
part of the model.
5.3 Model Dynamics
For assessing the risk of a power grid failure, safety and security aspects have to be
taken into account simultaneously. Let us take a look at the power grid depicted in
figure 3. Its node set consists of a single power producing node NP and several nodes
consuming power. The nodes are connected with each other by power transmission
lines. Let us assume that the control component of the node NC becomes a victim
of a cyber attack. The attacker switches off a power transmission line, say the
connection e4 between the nodes NC and ND. Now these nodes are not directly
connected anymore. The breakdown of transmission line e4 changes the probabilities
of many other potential failures due to the feedback mechanisms contained in the
given example. The power supply of the four nodesND, NE , NF , NG is not provided
by the two lines e4 between NC and ND and e5 between NC and NE anymore. Only
one of these connecting lines is left. The system tries to preserve the availability
of the grid by rescheduling the power flow interrupted by the failure of e4. The
rescheduling leads typically to a higher load for the remaining operational network
elements, which in turn leads to an increased probability of failure for them. This
may lead to the failure of the next component of the network within short notice.
When taking the rescheduling functionality of the network into consideration, an
risk resp. reliability assessment considering only the instantaneous situation at the
beginning is not valid anymore.
In effect, the rescheduling of the power flow may lead to a so-called cascading
failure switching off large parts of the network. For handling such phenomena,
the traditional methods for risk assessments are inappropriate [19], because the
inclusion of fault propagation mechanisms and thus an explicit modeling of system
dynamics seems to be mandatory. This is done by the simulation-based risk measure
presented in section 4. Simulating system dynamics allows to check whether the
effects of a fault or a fault sequence may act as causes of new faults due to overloads
of remaining components. Describing the dynamics of such a cascading failure, and
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Figure 3: A simple power grid, represented as a network. For an explanation, see
the text.
even more, predicting it trustworthy, is still a challenge for the reliability theory of
networks [10].
6 Discussion and Outlook
6.1 Simulation as Extension of Traditional Approaches
The proposed simulation-based risk measure R reproduces traditional statical no-
tions of risk at least approximatively. This is a good argument for the plausibility
of R. Indeed, a very small time horizon h limits L(h) to almost trivial sequences
consisting typically of just one cause and one effect. Under these conditions, R(h)
reproduces more or less the traditional safety risk measure R′ applied e.g. by the
FMEA method. In the case of comparatively ’simple’ systems, the errors induced
by the simplifying assumption will usually remain small. Then, R′ may be an
acceptable replacement for the risk measure R(h). For ’complex’ systems, the sim-
plifications become either unrealistic (e.g. cascading failures in power grids), or
insufficient (e.g. nuclear power plants), or will lead to results containing significant
errors.
Structurally, the risk measure R(h) of definition 11 and the traditional safety risk
measure R′ are similar. According to [45], R′ is the sum of all losses over all potential
problems weighted by their likelihoods. Main difference besides of the restriction
h ≳ 0 for R′ is that [45] speaks about likelihood and definition 11 about probability.
This is caused by different perspectives. Whereas [45] uses an analytic perspective
based on observations identifying equivalent problems in different contexts, the
model-based approach proposed here generates all possible evolution paths in an
individual way. Though technically, likelihoods and probabilities maybe different,
they coincide with respect to their meaning. Thus, our risk measure definition seems
to be fine for safety risks.
Let us now consider the situation from the security risk point of view. The
traditional risk measure R′′ used for security applications depends on another set of
parameters than the traditional safety risk measure R′. Whereas safety defines risk
as a product of the probability, that a hazard is realized, and its criticality, security
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takes vulnerability as explicit factor into account [33, 74] according to
risk = threat × vulnerability × criticality
Since we already demonstrated the approximate correspondence between the pro-
posed simulation-based risk measure R and the traditional safety risk measure R′
under the simplifying assumption h ≳ 0, it suffices to show the embeddability of the
security risk definition R′′ in the safety risk definition R′ for indicating an associ-
ation between R and R′′. Such an embedding can be constructed in the following
way. Since both definitions have criticality in common, the attributes of threat and
vulnerability have to be put into relation to the probability of safety risks. More pre-
cisely, probabilities for the occurrence of specific threat/vulnerability combinations
have to be given. Concerning this question, the reader is referred to quantitative
risk-based considerations as elaborated e.g. in [1, 7, 56, 57, 71, 77]. Of course, the
decision of a human being to launch a specific attack is primarily not based on prob-
ability. It becomes stochastical, however, as soon as one asks for the frequencies
with which such an attack happens, or for the frequencies of availability of necessary
ressources. Frequencies of attacks come into play, since different hackers may have
different goals, use different attacks, or assess the value of a specific target differ-
ently. Not all hackers have the capabilities to attack, and not all have the resources,
which are necessary for launching a successful attack. Indeed, attack methods like
social engineering can be described very well by means of success probabilities [68].
As another example, effort measures typically used e.g. for cryptanalysis can be
interpreted as probabilities by considering the ratio between successful attacks and
overall attack trials [2]. Accordingly, using a probabilistic description for security
aspects seems to be adequate [78]. Attack trees are an example assigning probabil-
ities to specific attacks [6, 89] and thus to threat-vulnerability pairs.
Another argument for a close relationship between safety and security risks is
environmental safety. The notion of risk used in this domain of application is based
on the terms of exposure and impact [39, 51], which have a close correspondence to
the terms of threats and vulnerabilities used in cyber security. The exposure-impact
concept of environmental risk takes external reasons of risks into consideration
similar to security and contrary to technical safety. Thus, safety-related impacts
correspond to vulnerabilities and safety-related exposures to security threats. In
effect, the overall probability of an actually occurring risk may be thought of as a
product of the probability, that a specific problem raises and the probability that
the problem is indeed able to affect the system. The topic is discussed further e.g.
in [68, 71, 75, 81].
6.2 Simulation and Computational Tractability of Risk
The proposed simulation-based risk assessment has many advantages. At the down-
side, computational tractability can not necessarily assured. Every fault introduces
an additional path in the simulation tree. If in the simulation e.g. controllability
of these faults have to be checked — the paths introduced by these faults will split
up further. Covering all paths in sufficient depth will thus be a challenge even in
the case of simple systems, and more or less impossible for complex systems. The
large size and the great number of links between components lead to many potential
faults and many fault propagation pathways; their brute-force handling gives a sim-
ulation tree with high branching factor, which is usually not handable anymore in
practice due to the exponential computational complexity required for follwing the
different branches. Thus, the system model should be abstract enough for restrict-
ing computational complexity. Furthermore, it is not always necessary to include
the complete simulation tree in the risk assessment. Sometimes it may suffice to
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include only a randomly selected set of representative paths. This means a replace-
ment of the exact assessment procedure by an approximating process, which may
select randomly a small number of system evolution paths with restricted length.
The approximation will only work, however, if the selected paths are representative
for the set of all contributions to the risk value. Otherwise, the calculated risk
value may with high probability be no good approximation of the exact value. For
granting the required representativeness, it may suffice e.g. to demand a certain
homogenity of the underlying system and to exclude the existence of rare events
with high criticality. An approximating strategy to risk assessments is common e.g.
in the business domain [73] for project risk determination. An application to risks
associated with a malware epidemics can be found in [27].
6.3 Simulation and Non-Computability of Risk
A more fundamental question than the computational effort for calculating R(h)
is the principal computability of R(h) for h → ∞. For focusing on the simulation
aspects, we tacitly assume in this context the well-definedness of all other objects
and structures assigned to the simulation paths. Due to the theorem of Rice [61],
the risk measure R(∞) is usually not decidable. It is a nontrivial property of a
general computable system, because the size of the language L(h) is maybe infinite.
Thus, only its enumeration can be realized e.g. by experimenting with simulations
[38, 52], which explore the effects of faults and intrusions on the system. This is an
analogon to other undecidability results like the issue whether a piece of code is a
self-replicating malware or whether a control process will still terminate after the
infection with a specific malware. In some way, this indicates the ’realism’ of the
proposed simulation-based risk measure R.
For assuring decidability for practical applications, a criterion has to be given
when to stop the simulation after finite time. This is done here by the time horizon
h representing the look-ahead length into the future. Its influence on the risk
assessment is decisive. If a small h triggers a stop too early, devastating hazards
may be missed; if the assessment process stops too late, the determination of the
risk may be compromised because too much effort is wasted on unimportant aspects.
This reminds at the quiescence search of algorithmic game theory [76].
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